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The Injuries of Platform Logistics 
 
Back in 2012, Amazon ran a television advertisement with the tag-line: ‘Connecting 
your mouse to your front door was our moon landing’ (see YouTube, 2012). The trick 
here is to draw attention to the experience of consumption whilst passing over the 
process of production that makes it possible, mobilising a space race rhetoric that is 
selective in the spaces that it acknowledges and that distracts the viewer from this 
device with its allusion to the revolutionary high-tech. The impact of digital platforms 
demands much closer attention to the geographies they form, and the infrastructure and 
logistics that sustain them (see Burrows, 2005; Peters, 2015; Plantin & Punathambekar, 
2019). Everything that is traded and distributed online utilises a material infrastructure, 
and labour and transport processes remain vital. This is something that can get lost in 
the marketers’ gloss of the weightless economy, where the exchange of goods and 
services is imagined without the gravity of physical labour. Online retail still requires 
things of heft and substance to be shifted through space, and that means people doing 
the shifting in spaces that require critical scrutiny.  
 
The danger is that we lose sight of the materiality of buying online when we focus 
excessively on the experience of consumption, on clicks and swipes at screens, and not 
on the productive processes that bring our goods to the doorstep. By connecting your 
2 
 
front door to your mouse – and then to your smartphone and various other networked 
devices – online retailers like Amazon are obscuring space rather than overcoming it. 
This is handy for the consumptive imaginary, as it renders invisible the spaces that our 
products move through. With deliveries now next-day, even same-day, we have become 
disconnected from logistical space-time. Longer delivery, of a few weeks say, might 
give some indication of the stages involved in bringing your goods to your doorstep: 
manufacture, freighting, warehousing, couriering. This in turn brings to mind the 
various spaces that a product would move through, from the factory to the port, the 
warehouse to the home. But the speed of delivery now is such that the process of 
bringing an item into your world is too fast to be fully perceptible. Important sites of 
labour evaporate from our awareness, as purchases arrive without a trace of their 
exteriority.  
 
This article offers a typology of injuries enacted by platform logistics, taking online 
retail as its focus and using Amazon as an exemplar. The typology is sustained by the 
idea that subtle but negative shifts in perception brought about by digital platforms not 
only mask the harm that is done to those who labour behind the platforms but constitute 
a form of injury themselves. Cognitive Injury occurs when platforms act to conceal their 
operation from the awareness of users (see Chun, 2016; Langlois & Elmer, 2019; 
Srnicek, 2017). In the first section, it is argued that the technological infrastructure and 
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speed of transactional satisfaction in online retail subjectivises users into a mode of 
unconscious consumption that dislocates buying online from the geography of 
fulfilment. This is a kind of psychological injury entailed by not being cognisant of the 
processes you make yourself part of when you engage with digital platforms. Hidden 
Injury is enacted on the invisible labour that sustains platform functionality, a 
precarious workforce that labours under harsh conditions and within hostile spaces, 
somewhere below the cognisance of the user (see Irani, 2015; Scholz, 2017; van Doorn, 
2017). The second section examines what the efficiency and obscurity of platform 
logistics in online retail hides: the injurious working conditions of the people tasked 
with delivering our orders on time. Moral Injury speaks to the way that platform 
logistics, in concealing from awareness the conditions that sustain its operation, attacks 
the ability of users, or of a society at large, to act with responsibility. In the concluding 
section, it is argued that the speed and obscurity of digital consumption creates a 
pollution of the sensible that attacks moral awareness and causes responsibility to waste 
away. This argument is drawn somewhere between the work of Emmanuel Levinas 
(2007; 2008) and Paul Virilio (1998; 1999).  
 
Taken altogether, the physical and emotional injury endured by logistical workers is 
hidden by a mode of digital consumption that does not fully engage our awareness, and 
these two injuries – cognitive and hidden – combine to create a kind of moral injury. 
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Cognitive injury affects the individual consumer (the ‘I’); hidden injury affects those 
others who toil in the underworld spaces of consumption (the ‘Other’); whilst moral 
injury consumes the ground that would allow the individual and the other to stand 
together – to form a collective or a responsible community (the ‘We’). By setting out 
this typology it is hoped that what follows can contribute towards a critical engagement 
with logistics as a spatial practice of circulation, highlighting the violence and injury 
that underpins this now ascendant calculative logic (see Chua, Danyluk, Cowen & 
Khalili, 2018), and posing questions about its role in relation to routine and everyday 
use of digital platforms (see Plantin & Punathambekar, 2019). Such an engagement is 
taken to be applicable beyond the narrower focus on online retail, and necessary for 
understanding that the power of digital capitalism lies not only in its ability to collect 
and store data, but to use this to manage the trajectories of the world – of commodities 
and of people. 
 
Cognitive Injury: Online Retail and Unconscious Consumption 
 
Benjamin Bratton (2015: 186) suggests that Amazon’s ‘platform logic’, its coordination 
of users, objects and data of various sorts, aims at the total organisation of all the 
world’s physical commodities. To understand a claim of this sort, we need to consider 
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the ways in which Amazon makes itself available to customers and encourages them to 
consume – and then how it fulfils this. 
 
Platform capitalism denotes a system where a small group of powerful technology firms 
have vertically integrated a vast range of services and functions that they then provide to 
others. Platforms are defined as ‘digital infrastructures that enable two or more groups 
to interact’, bringing together ‘customers, advertisers, service providers, producers, 
suppliers, and even physical objects’ (Srnicek, 2017: 43). A platform not only connects 
users but provides a ground for all their activities. ‘Platforms are platforms,’ suggests 
Tarleton Gillespie (2010: 351), ‘not necessarily because they allow code to be written or 
run, but because they afford an opportunity to communicate, interact or sell’. This 
grants the companies behind the platforms privileged access to a range of relational, 
migratory and transactional data. Platforms have a shop front, where they provide some 
service or other to users, but also a back of house where the information that this 
generates can be put to work. Whilst platforms come in many different forms (see 
Srnicek 2017: 60-64), an engineered obscurity is at the heart of their functionality (see 
Langlois & Elmer, 2019). We see this, for example, when labour platforms present 
themselves as tech companies rather than, say, taxi firms; when streaming platforms 
convince us to rent music rather than buy, without explicitly letting on to this 
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transformation in ownership; or when a company that appears to be in the business of 
social networking is really in the advertising game.  
 
Amazon has successfully lodged itself in the minds of users as an almost infinitely vast 
store, but it has also become so much more than a retailer. Today it is involved in 
television, cloud computing services, consumer electronics, labour exchange, robotics, 
healthcare, actual aerospace travel, and more besides, an expansion best characterised as 
infrastructuralisation (see Langlois & Elmer, 2019). Amazon has heavily invested in 
data centres to gain a foothold in cloud platforming, renting out its IT infrastructure to 
other companies and gaining access to their data in the process (Srnicek, 2017: 60-64). 
Amazon is essentially one of the largest server landlords in the world, and its cloud 
computing platform, Amazon Web Services, makes it a serious player in the material 
infrastructure of the internet (Cubitt, 2017: 17). Through Mechanical Turk, Amazon has 
developed its own hugely successful lean labour platform. Mechanical Turk is a kind of 
‘artificial artificial intelligence’ (Irani, 2015: 723) that offers speedy web solutions by 
using humans instead of algorithms, which can take too much time to develop (725). It 
was founded in 2005 after Amazon found that actual artificial intelligence did a poorer 
job of locating duplicate products on its webpages than human perception (Aytes, 2013: 
79-80). Mechanical Turk is an online marketplace for discrete bits of labour, allowing 
companies to hire workers to perform Human Intelligence Tasks for a few quid a time. 
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Trebor Scholz (2017: 16) reckons that this stands as ‘an influential template for the 
future of work’; this would be a future of lean, just-in-time and piecemeal labour 
facilitated via app, and one perhaps not so unfamiliar to those presently caught up in the 
gig economy (see Hill, 2015: 19). At the heart of all of Amazon’s endeavours is an 
almost unrivalled access to information. Ultimately, data has become its stock-in-trade 
and its ability to put this data to work has established Amazon as a powerful and 
ubiquitous force within platform capitalism.  
 
Amazon is a good example of what Wendy Chun (2016) describes as the disappearing 
from consciousness of ‘habitual media’, even when its infrastructural presence has 
never been writ larger on the world – a process of withholding from awareness what 
ought to be at the centre of our attention, or, cognitive injury. We see this in the way 
that Amazon retains an image as an online retailer whilst essentially being in the 
business of digital real estate. More specifically, we can also find this process at play in 
the way that we consume through Amazon. Martin Dodge (1999: 7) has observed that 
Amazon’s website is not only ‘its storefront to the world’ but also a form of geography 
itself – a ‘geography of the screen’. This terrain has altered over the years, first as 
mobile internet allowed for the website to be accessed anywhere, then as the app 
streamlined access to all the products contained in the store, and now with devices such 
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as the Amazon Echo and the Amazon Dash reducing navigation and consumption to 
their simplest forms.  
 
The Echo is a speaker that speaks to you. Once set up in a room, it listens in the 
background, ready to respond to the user’s spoken requests, be that ordering products 
from Amazon, streaming songs via Amazon Music, reading newspaper articles aloud, or 
engaging with third party apps such as Deliveroo, the takeaway delivery service. The 
Dash is a much simpler bit of kit. It is essentially just a button, tethered to a branded 
product. A regular consumer of, for example, a particular brand of laundry detergent or 
razor blades can hit the button when running low and their stocks will be replenished 
within a few hours. Making products as accessible as possible, through an easily 
navigable website (managed by ‘Turkers’) or an app that can be accessed anywhere via 
smart phone, and making ordering as simple as asking aloud in your living room or 
hitting a button on top of your washing machine, is key to Amazon’s success. The speed 
that Amazon aims for is not just in getting your products from the warehouse to your 
front door; the longer you have to wait to access a purchasing platform, or the more 
stages you have to go through in placing your order, the more likely you are to get cold 
feet, and so the quicker purchases can be made, the better. The Dash is the perfection of 
this attempt to streamline the number of steps in a transaction, although one-click 
purchasing via the website or app has long encouraged the haste in purchasing that 
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minimises the process. This minimisation allows purchasing to fade into the 
background, or even to become the background to our everyday experience. Amazon is 
not a successful platform player simply because it umbrellas out into industry and cloud 
computing and so on, but also because it has successfully made its platform ubiquitous 
within the user’s environment.  
 
Platform ubiquity encourages unconscious consumption. When we are constantly 
connected to retail environments via networked technologies, we come to inhabit an 
omnipresent marketplace, a condition that is promoted under the name u-commerce (or, 
ubiquitous commerce). Under these conditions, consumers are ‘always on’, potentially 
never not available to consumption, located within a marketplace that has no temporal 
or spatial constraints. As McGuigan and Manzerolle (2015: 1832) argue, this casts 
consumption as an ‘unnoticed component of social reality’, entrenched, more dug-in 
than ever, but because naturalised also barely perceptible. Purchasing becomes 
automatic, even taking place at a level beyond the consciousness of the consumer. 
Adam Greenfield (2017: 36) suggests that this is precisely the point of devices such as 
the Echo and the Dash, and the Internet of Things in general: ‘to short-circuit the 
process of reflection that stands between one’s recognition of a desire and its fulfilment 
via the market’ by transforming intimate space into one of constant technological 




Amazon’s platform infrastructure acts as a central nervous system, embedded in 
geographies whilst creating a shop-floor wherever we desire it. But this seemingly 
frictionless and omnipresent marketplace hides its weight behind interfaces. When 
consumption becomes this unthinking, when our products are only one click or a ‘Hello 
Alexa’ or the push of a button away, and when they arrive next-day, even same-day, the 
platform acts to conceal the labour that brings our purchases to the doorstep. The taken-
for-grantedness of everyday digital platforms (Gehl & McKelvey, 2019), when coupled 
with modes of consumption that work on the preconscious or unconscious, on the fact 
that we are not fully paying attention (Langlois & Elmer, 2019), renders the labour 
behind buying online invisible. This ‘hidden abode of production’ at the heart of 
commodity fetishism is hardly new (Marx, 1990: 279), but what is remarkable is the 
speed and ease with which the concealment of social relations can be facilitated. 
Tracking purchases through the website or app presents an abstract geography – 
package has shipped; out for delivery; your item has been delivered – that gives the 
illusion of smoothness behind the speed. This is cognitive injury. The instantaneity 
inherent to ubiquitous platforms, the speed not only of delivery but also of the 
transaction itself, leads to what Paul Virilio (1998: 16) calls a ‘generalized arrival’: the 
goods arrive without seemingly having ever left. Unconscious consumption affords no 




Hidden Injury: Order Fulfilment and Invisible Labour 
 
Lily Irani’s (2015: 730) observation that Mechanical Turk limits the visibility of its low-
paid and insecure workers is instructive. Ubiquitous consumption can never be 
frictionless, and the hope that it might, or myth that it already is, ‘sanitizes the 
materiality of media and markets’ (McGuigan & Manzerolle, 2015: 1845). There will 
always be some attrition when it comes to moving goods around, something that is too 
readily overlooked if we over-emphasise the geography of the screen or the 
weightlessness of a digital economy.  
 
If we are to understand the human cost of buying online, its hidden injury, then we need 
to understand the way that it configures place as a logistical network. Srnicek (2017: 50) 
has argued that Amazon is not so much an e-commerce enterprise as it is a logistics 
company; its main purpose is shifting goods around the globe in the most efficient way 
possible, collecting data as it goes in order to streamline the process. Amazon does not 
just make the devices and websites we order from; it does not just own the data centres 
that sustain the orders we make: Amazon also owns the distribution and order fulfilment 
infrastructure that delivers our purchases, as well as all the data generated by our orders 
and their delivery (Greenfield, 2017: 279). By venturing into warehousing and 
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freighting, Amazon has not diversified away from its origins as an online retailer; 
instead, it has perfected its mission, vertically integrating the full means of 
communication (see Morley 2011). Bratton (2015: 131-133) argues that Amazon’s 
success rests on its logistical expertise, which in turn is sustained by its ability to utilise 
its data wealth to compress supply and retail distribution chains.  
 
Business logistics is, at heart, an attempt at the successful management of capitalism in 
motion. Amazon’s compression ought to be understood as a form of lean logistics, 
which involves incorporating the whole supply chain – ordering, production, 
distribution, warehousing – under a single managerial regime (Bonacich & Wilson, 
2008). It has its origins in the production methods first popularised by the car industry, 
including just-in-time inventory control and an emphasis on pull rather than push 
production, a mode of organising production and distribution that has grown to become 
a more general, and wildly successful, operating philosophy (see Wright & Lund, 
2006). This is a philosophy that aims towards a very simple resolution: operational 
efficiency. Distribution was long seen as a ‘necessary evil’, a bridge between production 
and consumption where no value could be added (Newsome 2010: 191). Lean logistics 
sought to minimise inventory build-up to prevent over-production by manufacturers and 
over-stocking by retailers. In turn, logistical spaces became fruitful sites for adding 




There are two broad consequences of this. The first is that the logistics industry became 
subject to increasing centralisation and automation, with a simultaneous concentration 
of distribution into fewer centres and shrinking of the workforce (Newsome, 2010: 194; 
Wright & Lund, 2006: 62). The second consequence was a rise in retailer power. A 
move from push to pull ordering means that suppliers and distributors are forced to 
respond to retailer demand. This means that power within the supply chain shifts from 
the capacity of producers to the demands of consumption (Wright & Lund, 2006: 61). 
Retailers can now exert pressure on logistics companies, setting performance indicators 
and demanding speedier and more efficient supply. The lean philosophy solidified into 
regimes of control that exert themselves forcefully onto the working conditions of those 
who labour within logistical space. The result is low pay, deskilling, and the 
intensification of already monotonous work increasingly carried out by temporary 
workers. To keep goods in perpetual motion, any impediment to the extraction of effort 
must be removed. This calls for the imposition of ‘engineered standards’ – labour 
management systems that are designed to intensify work (Wright & Lund, 2006: 64) – 
as well as key performance indicators, time and motion studies, and other tools of 
surveillance and control that eradicate discretionary effort (Newsome, Thompson & 
Commander, 2013: 2). This enforcement of obligatory effort chips away at worker 
autonomy, intensifies stress and illness while it increases workload, and attacks the 
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solidarity of the workforce as they are forced to compete against one another to meet 
targets. 
 
As a key logistical site, the warehouse has been especially susceptible to the negative 
impact of lean logic. Warehousing had traditionally been located within the industrial 
sector, benefitting from collective bargaining over work conditions and pay, but this 
began to shift in the 1980s when, at the same time that the value-adding function of the 
warehouse as a profit centre was realised, it was recast as a part of the service economy 
under the power of retailers, bringing with it the lower pay and increased insecurity 
shared by shop workers, food servers and the like (Mulholland & Stewart, 2013: 537). 
Work conditions were further depleted by the sorts of performance and productivity 
indicators that could easily be applied to the highly routinised work that took place in 
warehouses (Moore & Piwek, 2017: 312). These were vital in implementing the 
perpetual motion model of ‘cross-docking’, where goods would come into the 
warehouse and then be loaded for immediate distribution (Wright & Lund, 2006: 62), 
transforming the warehouse from a place of temporary inventory storage to a hub of 
motion where stock seldom stands still. The constant mobility of goods is sustained by 
hourly pick rates that are, in essence, decided by the consumer and enforced by the 
retailer, rather than by what is actually feasible or safe. As such, the work is not only 
relentless and monotonous, but physically deleterious, with constant lifting, bending and 
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stretching leading to weight loss, exhaustion and injury (Mulholland & Stewart, 2013: 
552). The speed required of workers, the intensification of the temporality of loading 
and unloading, and the strict enforcement of unrealistic rates, leads to reckless working. 
As a foreman in Kirsty Newsome’s study of warehousing acknowledged: ‘there’s a 
corner to be cut everywhere if you’re willing to put half your workforce in hospital’ 
(2010: 200). This physical degradation is matched by the attack on self-esteem that 
comes from working in a low-trust regime. Traditional Taylorist methods of monitoring 
have been supplemented with an array of sensors and trackers that generate data on 
workers’ movements, log periods of sedentariness and set levels of effort tailored to the 
individual employee (Moore & Piwek, 2017: 308). Wearable devices are used in 
warehouses not only to monitor worker activity, but also to allocate required work and 
to set the unsustainable pace that facilitates the perpetual motion of goods. Perhaps it is 
no surprise that the warehouse is widely seen as ‘an employer of last resort’ 
(Mulholland & Stewart, 2013: 536). 
 
The warehouse has become, in the nomenclature of Amazon, the fulfilment centre, 
which at least hints at the way that consumerist desire is leading supply chains by the 
nose. Amazon’s power over its suppliers and distributors is a result of its platform scale, 
allowing for what Bratton (2015: 331) calls ‘supply chain omniscience’. Amazon’s total 
integration of informatics and logistics ‘allows them a line-of-sight into the supply 
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chains that is so comprehensive ... that they can set wholesale prices (and wages) at 
skin-thin margins because they know more about their suppliers’ bottom-line costs than 
their suppliers do’ (Bratton, 2015: 330). Pay and conditions in Amazon’s fulfilment 
centres reflect those elsewhere in the warehousing industry. Workers are often on fixed, 
short-term contracts, hired via an outsourcing agency, with no benefits or raises, or even 
opportunity for advancement or permanency (Greenfield, 2017: 195). Recently, there 
has been a shift from sub-contracting back to direct hire, as the demands of e-commerce 
– picking individual items for home delivery rather than cases to transport to retailers – 
has increased the number of pickers required, albeit with no less insecurity or 
disposability (Loewen, 2018). An undercover report into UK fulfilment centres in the 
Mirror in 2017 revealed a picking rate of 120 items per hour – one every 30 seconds – 
for an individual employee, at a rate of 7p per item, and working weeks of up to 55 
hours (Selby, 2017). By the time the Guardian did a similar exposé a year later, the rate 
had increased to 250 items an hour, with shifts of up to ten and a half hours, for 
remuneration of about £18,000 a year (Ferguson, 2018).  
 
In Germany, fulfilment centre workers are bussed in by Amazon (but fined if those 
buses are late), and retained on temporary contracts that offer few rights, permit pay 
docking at will, and that motivate workers to accept dangerous working conditions for 
fear of being let go (Fuchs, 2014: 2-3). In Scotland, they have resorted to sleeping in 
17 
 
tents close to the fulfilment centres in order to save money (Kentish, 2016), and in the 
United States, many of the workers have become reliant on food aid to supplement their 
pay (Schiller, 2018). Workers can walk around 11 miles per shift (Dyer-Witheford, 
2015: 172), are forced to stand when they are not walking (Butler, 2018), and have been 
observed asleep on their feet (Selby, 2017). The man from the Mirror reported 
increased blood pressure and a higher resting heart rate during his time working 
undercover in a fulfilment centre (Selby, 2017), and many workers report suffering 
physical pain from the exertion of picking and packing (Butler, 2018). In 2018, Amazon 
fulfilment centres were named as one of the most dangerous places to work in the US 
for avoidable workplace injuries (Sainato, 2018). Workers have said that they fear being 
punished if they miss work due to injury or illness (Boyd, 2018), which might explain 
the incidences of ambulances being called to the fulfilment centres to assist collapsed 
workers (Butler, 2018). And they report that it is difficult to take toilet breaks, which 
are timed in the interests of productivity, with toilets being as far away as a third of a 
mile by foot (Selby, 2017), to the extent that workers have taken to pissing in bottles or 
going without water in order to avoid being disciplined (Boyd, 2018). Fulfilment 
centres are ‘passing out hot’ in the summer – not ideal if you are going nil by mouth – 
as they are kept sealed to prevent pilfering (Greenfield, 2017: 47). These are low trust 
regimes that employ a number of monitoring processes against their workforces. 
Workers undergo mandatory security screenings when they leave the centres, without 
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any payment for the time taken from them (Scholz, 2017: 25). They are also subjected 
to performance metrics, monitored through every minute of their zero hours contracts 
(Moore & Robinson, 2016: 2779), with wearables used to ensure productivity is kept 
up, even at the risk of burnout or breakdown (Moore & Piwek, 2017: 311). Back in 
Germany, Christian Fuchs (2014, pp. 2-3) describes security guards patrolling the 
facilities dressed like a paramilitary force, whilst in Wales the centres have been 
compared to forced labour camps (Moore & Robinson, 2016: 2780). Greenfield (2017: 
195) concludes that these fulfilment centres ‘are places that no one sane would choose 
to be if they had any other option at all’. 
 
Then there are the drivers who take the goods in and out of the warehouses. Trucking, 
like warehousing, has been a casualty of the increased power of retailers, who have 
driven down distribution costs and created a race to the bottom, characterised by 
weakened unions, low pay and impaired working conditions (Bonacich & Wilson, 
2008). The situation has become so poor that Michael Belzer (2006), reflecting on the 
impact of deregulation in the sector, has described logistics vehicles as ‘sweatshops on 
wheels’. Given the price of fuel and considering that fuel costs can amount to as much 
as 40% of all operating costs for the distributor, slow and steady driving is essential for 
efficiency savings (Gregson, 2017: 347). This is handy, as it has been reported that 
drivers have been fined for delivering their loads early to Amazon fulfilment centres 
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(Selby, 2017). It may feel counterintuitive, but seen through the lens of lean logic, 
where the immobility of goods is an egregious inefficiency, early deliveries are sunk 
costs. But despite its status as a strategic site for cost saving, the trucking industry is not 
without rigorous regulation. In the UK, drivers face a four-and-a-half hour limit before 
they have to take a 45 minute break, and can drive for no more than nine hours in any 
24 hour period (this can be extended to ten hours but no more than twice a week); they 
must take eleven hours continuous rest between work days; and have a fortnightly limit 
of ninety hours, and no more than 56 hours in any single week (see Gregson, 2017: 
348). Compliance is measured by tachograph, Radio Frequency Identification and GPS, 
technologies that the drivers regard as ‘the office spy in the cab’ (Gregson, 2017: 348). 
There are no exceptions to these rules; if you hit your limit, you must pull over, no 
matter how close you are to delivering your goods. Lorry drivers, then, at least operate 
under some regulation of time, but for the van drivers, who take the goods to their final 
fulfilment, delivering them to our front doors, things are less clear.  
 
Amazon contracts out its doorstep delivery to companies that regard their drivers as 
independent contractors, avoiding payroll taxes, employee benefits, compensation 
payments and so on, and so keeping supply chain costs down (Dyer-Witheford, 2015: 
172-173). They use well known couriers such as DHL, DPD, Hermes, UPS and Yodel, 
amongst others. Drivers are paid per parcel delivered, face pay deductions for failure to 
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meet steep targets, and get by on what can amount to below minimum wage. With 
delivery rates of up to 200 parcels a day, and little enforcement of daily driving limits 
for vans (eleven hours in the EU), it is no surprise that couriers feel compelled to break 
speed limits and drive tired (England, 2016), or that they are significantly more likely to 
be involved in road traffic accidents (Christie & Ward, 2018). Monitoring devices 
perform the role of the spy in the van, but rather than ensure compliance to safe driving 
limits, they act to scrutinise the delivery efficiency of the drivers, measured negatively 
for inadequate haste. Like their counterparts in the warehouses, delivery targets and the 
threat of penalties force drivers to piss in bottles rather than take sanitary toilet breaks; 
worse still, some drivers feel so pushed for time that they have taken to shitting in the 
back of their vans as well (England, 2016). This close association of workers with 
excrement performs a dehumanising function, further exacerbated by the threat of fines 
for drivers who need to take sick days, simultaneously rubbing workers’ noses in their 
bodily functions whilst alienating them from bodily autonomy. DPD changed its policy 
on such fines – £150 a day for missing work due to ill health – when, in 2018, a diabetic 
driver died after missing appointments with his doctor for fear of disciplinary reprisal 
(Booth, 2018). The same year also saw a legal challenge to the contractor status of 
drivers delivering for companies used by Amazon, contending that they ought to be 
treated as employees, with all the attendant rights and benefits that would bring (Butler 
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& Smithers, 2018). DPD have even brought in sick pay, as well as paid holiday and 
access to a pension scheme (Booth, 2018).  
 
However, gains made with big name couriers are precarious, and can be undermined by 
taking delivery further into the gig economy, where deliveries can be made by anyone 
with a car and a smartphone. Amazon Flex is a service that matches users with 
deliveries to be taken on ‘the last mile’ from fulfilment centres to customers’ homes 
(see Menegus, 2017). Drivers use their own vehicle and pay their own fuel costs. The 
service is accessed via an app in much the same way that Uber operates, allocating jobs 
and setting out delivery routes. Amazon undertake screening and background checks but 
provide little to no training. Work-time is parcelled up into blocks, and no overtime is 
received if drivers exceed the time allotted for deliveries by the system – even if delays 
are caused by the poor operation of the system itself. Pay deductions are made for failed 
deliveries, and users are deactivated and locked out of using the app if their 
performance – recorded through the same app that sets out the work – is deemed to fall 
short. Ultimately, Flex allows Amazon to decrease its reliance on the big couriers and 
take further control of the supply chain, but it also opens delivery driving up to 
amateurs whose only qualification for the job is a driving license, and who lack the 




It is striking that at no point during the fulfilment of an order does the customer interact 
with or even see someone who works for Amazon. The pickers are hidden from sight, 
sealed away in fulfilment centres without natural light and located somewhere exurban, 
beyond our daily experience, out there in logistical space. Their labour is rendered 
invisible: not immaterial, in fact painfully embodied, but nevertheless ethereal to the 
consumptive process. The delivery drivers who hand over our purchases on the doorstep 
bear the logos of contracted couriers, or none in the case of Amazon Flex contractors, 
who have no uniform and are permitted to work in their civvies. They are the only part 
of the process we encounter, and whether they are dehydrated or constipated or half 
asleep from punishing hours, they do not have the name Amazon emblazoned on them. 
Their hardship is subtly disassociated from Amazon as a company. And this 
disassociation can be furthered by removing the encounter altogether. Amazon Locker 
allows customers to have their purchases delivered to a secure box, located somewhere 
public like a shopping centre or a newsagent, to be collected at their leisure. Amazon 
Key is a device fitted to the customer’s front door that allows delivery drivers to let 
themselves in and drop off the goods unnoticed. And if that seems altogether too 
intimate, Amazon Prime customers can set their car as a shipping address and have 




Ultimately, the direction of travel is towards removing the human altogether. Fulfilment 
centre employees are already worked like robots, even if they cannot keep up with the 
carefully orchestrated cybernetic ballet of the logistical order. Back in 2014, it was 
announced that Amazon would fill its warehouses with blue collar robots, buying Kiva 
Systems and investing in Rethink Robotics to equip them for the eventual automation 
(Dyer-Witheford, 2015: 172; Stiegler, 2016: 59). It is also developing autonomous 
trucking and drone delivery (Greenfield, 2017: 278). We have this disenchantment of 
interaction to look forward to; in the meantime, whilst human workers are retained, the 
overwhelming experience is one of mystification. Logistical spaces are cast as ‘latent 
worlds’ (Thrift, 2008: 19), an unremarkable and under-scrutinised geography that is 
difficult to question – if it poses any questions at all – despite its prominence in our 
consumer society. This is hidden injury. The workers that inhabit these spaces fade 
away amidst the disorienting speed and managed obscurity of ubiquitous and 
instantaneous consumption. 
 
Moral Injury: Platform Capitalism and the Pollution of Responsibility 
 
The ‘myth of immaterial media’ (Cubitt, 2017: 13) in e-commerce is sustained by the 
material hardship of invisible labour that is further removed from our cognisance by an 
unconscious mode of consumption encouraged by ubiquitous platforms. Unremarkable 
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and everyday activities become wrapped up in the business ontology of the digital 
economy, until the act of buying products takes on its high-tech sheen and the 
experience, rather than the fulfilment, of consumption is dematerialized. Supply chains 
and labour conditions are obscured, becoming part of the unconscious of consumer 
society. The goods arrive without any explicit departure, no story to tell of their time 
spent in trucks and warehouses and vans, or of the people with whom they shared these 
logistical spaces. They lack exteriority. This production/consumption dualism is 
unsustainable; as Robert Sack (1992: 103-104) observes, ‘the very act of consuming 
mass-produced products then makes us agents of production by perpetuating places and 
processes of production, distribution, pollution, depletion and destruction’.  
 
A focus on warehousing and delivery does not give a full history of the products bought 
online. Before they reach the fulfilment centres, most products will already have taken a 
journey by air or, much more commonly, by sea. Amazon Air is an integrated cargo 
airline used for the former, and Amazon has recently – perhaps belatedly – entered the 
sea freight sector with Shipping With Amazon. These extensions of logistical space will 
present their own material hardship. And before we can make an order, we need a 
device – tablet or smartphone, Echo or Dash – built somewhere else under often 
harmful conditions. Tech companies exert their power over factories in much the same 
way that retailers do with logistics provision, remotely setting time-to-market regardless 
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of safe capacity for production, posing a risk to the health and safety of factory workers 
(Chan, Pun & Selden, 2013: 102). In 2018 it was reported that workers making 
Amazon’s Echo speakers and Kindle e-readers at a Foxconn factory in China were hired 
and paid illegally, and then treated as disposable hostages to the capriciousness of 
demand (Chamberlain, 2018). Elsewhere at Foxconn, workers have been tasked with 
eliminating tiny defects in the cases of smartphones under pressure from tech 
companies acting on the behalf of picky customers, forced to spot scratches little more 
than a couple of hundredths of a millimetre, causing headaches and eyestrain (Chan, 
Pun & Selden, 2013: 110). Just keeping these things shiny for the consumer causes 
health problems, as dust particles from polishing the devices can lead to respiratory 
disease (Parikka, 2015: 89). 
 
In an older currency, the word consumption is used to refer to a wasting disease, most 
commonly pulmonary tuberculosis, which attacks the lungs and causes extreme weight 
loss and fatigue. Jussi Parikka observes that tuberculosis disintegrates and 
dematerialises; it ‘releases the body from matter’ (2015: 86). Buying online causes a 
kind of pollution of perception, an industrial bi-product of platform ubiquity and the 
imposition of speed and efficiency in the supply chain, that leads to moral consumption, 
or the wasting away of our moral awareness. A symptom of this is the disintegration of 
responsibility. The rhythms that shape logistical space, and draw the customer into 
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unthinking complicity, exceed human perception. Beyond the geography of the screen 
and that of the doorstep, buying online has been rendered insensible. We have lost 
contact with the spaces of labour and the workers that toil in them. Contact is essential 
to the moral relationship set out in the work of Emmanuel Levinas (2007; 2008). For 
Levinas, our sensory experience of others is more akin to touch than to the processing 
of information. The other intimately caresses the eye, the ear, the skin. To touch is to 
experience a fundamental encounter with exteriority. The ‘I’ is opened up to, directed 
towards, that which lies outside of itself, beyond its own sensory interest and everyday 
concern; we turn towards the other, and, recognising that they lie beyond our 
comprehension, that they cannot be reduced to a possession of our thought, we assume 
responsibility – in case we harm what we face yet can never quite fully grasp. But 
platform capitalism pollutes the senses and denies exteriority. This is moral injury. 
Platform workers are largely lost in the smog of speed and efficiency, or what Virilio 
(1998) calls grey ecology: the degradation of the social environment caused by the 
reconfiguration of space and time by digital technology. The more technologically 
connected we are, the more complicit we become with platforms that brutally and 
deleteriously exploit the supply chain, while our awareness of the process wastes away.  
 
The above covers only a small part of a globally connected story. We could go further 
down the supply chain and look at the appalling conditions endured by the miners who 
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pull minerals like coltan or lithium out of the earth to make vital components for our 
digital devices; or at the environmental costs of the air pollution generated by freighting 
and distribution, or by the energy costs of maintaining the whole consumptive 
apparatus. These are essential considerations if we are to fully understand the moral 
implications of buying online – and digital technology in general (see for example 
Cubitt, 2017; Fuchs, 2014; Parikka, 2015) – and provide just some potential areas of 
further application for the typology set out above. In the first section it was argued that 
digital platforms inflict a cognitive injury on users by concealing their operation from 
awareness. This is seen most starkly in online retail through the unconscious 
consumption enacted by the speed of purchasing and delivery. In the second section it 
was argued that digital platforms are sustained by the hidden injury of invisible labour. 
This was explored through the harmful and precarious labour undertaken by the 
logistics workers who fulfil orders. In conclusion, digital platforms create a kind of 
moral injury, the pollution of the perceptual field in a way that causes awareness and 
responsibility to waste away, like a tubercular disease. This is the real dematerialization, 
the proper weightlessness of our technologically connected consumer society: that of a 
moral burden dissipated and lifted. Overall, the cognitive injury of unconscious 
consumption makes it easier for the hidden injury perpetrated in logistical spaces to 
remain hidden, and both injuries combine in ways that are injurious to moral 




Only by recognising that platform capitalism is, at heart, supply chain capitalism, and 
scrutinising the logistical spaces it creates, can we begin to bear responsibility for the 
suffering that sustains it. All the data that platforms soak up situates each of us within a 
logistical network that reaches far beyond our doorstep. Logistics does not end with us; 
we are not the terminus of its process, even if we feel that our consumptive desires have 
been fulfilled. Instead, we are each just another moving piece within a logistical 
environment governed by platforms and fuelled by data. And what matters most is how 
that dynamic shapes our movements. Platform capitalism privileges the trajectories of 
commodities and of data. And yet, for Virilio (1999: 81), ‘trajectory’ more vitally 
‘means going towards the other’. What is most injurious about this interplay of 
cognitive and hidden injury is that it interrupts our orientation towards the other.  
 
Metric power enacts a logistical society. And it is far from certain that moral 
responsibility can thrive under these conditions. The question is not only what are we 
missing (hidden injury) but how do we miss it (cognitive injury) and what does it cost 
us (moral injury)? If we can apply this more widely to the digital platforms that organise 
our worlds, more deeply down our supply chains and through our logistical networks, 
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